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In this article, we analyse the relationship between the Bell violation and the secure key rate
of entanglement assisted quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols. Specifically, we address the
question whether Bell violation is necessary or sufficient for secure communication. We construct a
class of states which do not show Bell violation, however, which can be used for secure communication
after local filtering. Similarly, we identify another class of states which show Bell violation but can
not be used for generating secure key even after local filtering. The existence of these two classes
of states demonstrates that Bell violation as an initial resource is neither necessary nor sufficient
for QKD. Our work therefore forces a departure from traditional thinking that the degree of Bell
violation is a key resource for quantum communication and brings out the role of local filtering.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum correlations have been instrumental in the
development of quantum key distribution (QKD) proto-
cols, where two parties Alice and Bob establish a secret
key for secure communication [1–5]. QKD protocols can
be classified into two different classes. The first class
contains the prepare and measure schemes which involve
Alice preparing the system in one of many possible states
and transmitting it to Bob. Bob then performs a mea-
surement on the same. Afterwards both the parties per-
form basis reconciliation and distill out a secret key. Ex-
amples of such schemes include BB84 [3], B92 [6], six
state protocol [7] and SARG04 [8]. The second class of
QKD schemes involves the use of entanglement [9] and
are termed as entanglement assisted QKD protocols, e.g.
the E91 protocol [10]. QKD Protocols in both classes
are proven to be robust against eavesdropping [11–15]
and are fundamentally secure as opposed to the classical
key distribution protocols.
In the entanglement assisted QKD protocols Bell-
violation is a necessary condition for the security of the
protocol [16–20]. However, it has also been shown that
there exist bipartite bound entangled states which can
be used to distill a secure key but do not violate any
known Bell’s inequalities [21]. Bell’s inequalities, like the
CHSH inequality [22], I3322 inequality [23, 24] and the
CGLMP inequality [25] characterize the non-classicality
of the correlations. It is also known that entanglement
is necessary but not sufficient to violate a Bell’s inequal-
ity [26]. This renders a huge class of entangled states un-
usable for QKD. On the other hand, the question whether
Bell violation is sufficient for the security of QKD is also
not settled and has been a matter of debate [14]. Since
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entanglement is an expensive resource, it is important to
ask if one can carry out QKD with states which are entan-
gled but do violate Bell’s inequalities thereby exploiting
entanglement.
In this article, we provide conclusive evidence that
Bell-violation is neither necessary nor sufficient for the
security of QKD protocols, thereby proving a conjecture
put forward by Acin et. al. [14]. We devise a geometrical
representation of correlations and relate the CHSH vio-
lation with the secure key rate for the protocols where
the secure key rate is a function of the error rate only.
Such a representation allows direct inference of secure key
rate alongwith Bell violation, and states offering optimal
security can be directly identified. Using this represen-
tation we identify a class of states showing Bell violation
but not offering a secure key. These states are therefore
of no use for QKD as they lead to a high error rate and
no security.
Local filtering operations allow states to reveal hidden
Bell non-locality [27] and can therefore increase the se-
cure key rate. Classical distillation of key has been previ-
ously considered in the literature [28]. We, however, use
quantum filtering processes to relate secure key rate and
Bell violation. It is found that filtering can transform
useless states into a useful resource for QKD. Our work
is also expected to have an impact in device indepen-
dent QKD, where Bell violation plays a major role [29]
and may lead to feasible experimental implementation.
There are states that violate Bell-CHSH inequality and
still cannot be transformed into states useful for QKD.
Since these states are entangled, under general multicopy
entanglement distillation these states can in principle be
made useful. However, we restrict ourselves to local fil-
tering which is a special class of entanglement distillation
and can be applied to one copy at a time. Experimentally,
local filtering is much more accessible than multicopy en-
tanglement distillation [30].
The article is arranged as follows: In Section II we re-
view the Bell-CHSH inequality, outline a general entan-
glement assisted QKD protocol and give a brief descrip-
tion of local filtering operations. In Section III we de-
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2velop a geometrical representation of correlations which
provides a clear picture of how various states would fare
for QKD and show that application of local filtering op-
erations is indeed advantageous. In Section IV we offer
concluding remarks and discussions.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section we provide the relevant background with
an aim to calculate various quantities such as the Bell-
CHSH violation and the secure key rate in entanglement
assisted QKD protocols. In Section. II C we briefly out-
line local filtering operations on two-qubit systems.
A. Bell-CHSH inequality
The Bell-CHSH inequality quantifies the correlations
arising from measurements on two-qubit states. All cor-
relations which violate the inequality are termed as non-
local correlations as they defy explanation by any local
realistic hidden variable model (LRHVM).
The CHSH inequality involves two parties Alice and
Bob sharing an entangled state ρ. Each party performs
two measurements, having two outcomes ±1 on their re-
spective subsystem. Let {A0, A1} be the measurement
operators in Alice’s lab and {B0, B1} be the measure-
ment operators in Bob’s lab. We can define a joint oper-
ator B = A0 ⊗B0 +A0 ⊗B1 +A1 ⊗B0 −A1 ⊗B1 which
is called the Bell operator. The Bell-CHSH inequality
states that the expectation value S of the Bell operator
B for the classical situations describable by LRHVM is
bounded between 2 and −2, i.e.,
S = |B| ≤ 2. (1)
However, some quantum states violate this bound im-
plying that there is no LRHVM for the corresponding
physical situations.
An arbitrary two-qubit state ρ can be written in the
Bloch form as [31]
ρ =
1
4
[1⊗1+r ·σ⊗1+1⊗s ·σ+
3∑
i,j=1
Tijσi⊗σj ], (2)
where r and s are three-dimensional real vectors charac-
terizing the reduced density matrices of the first and the
second qubit and T is a 3 × 3 real matrix representing
the correlations between the two qubits. The state ρ can
also be parameterized linearly with real parameters as
ρ =
1
4
3∑
i,j=0
Mijσi ⊗ σj , (3)
where σ0 is the 2 × 2 identity matrix and Mij is the
Mueller matrix [32], with M11 = Tr(ρ), M0j = s
T , Mi0 =
r andMij = T ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. This representation turns
out to be quite useful as will become evident.
The measurement operators {A0, A1} and {B0, B1} are
defined as
Ai = ai · σ, Bi = bi · σ, (4)
where ai and bi are normalized three-dimensional real
vectors. In this new notation, we can calculate the ex-
pectation value of the Bell operator as
S = at0Tb0 + a
t
0Tb1 + a
t
1Tb0 − at1Tb1. (5)
Simple algebra shows that for a given two-qubit state ρ
the maximum value of S that can be achieved for optimal
measurements is [33]
max{S} = 2
√
λ21 + λ
2
2, (6)
where λ1 and λ2 are the two largest singular values of
the correlation matrix T with their value bounded from
above by 1. Therefore, the maximum Bell violation is
achieved when S = 2
√
2 [34].
An interesting point to note is that the violation of
the Bell-CHSH inequality does not depend on the Bloch
vectors r and s, but only on the correlation matrix T .
Therefore, different state with the same correlation ma-
trix result in the same value of S which itself is deter-
mined by the two parameters λ1 and λ2 only.
Therefore, if we fix the optimized Bell violation param-
eter S we obtain a relation between λ1 and λ2 giving us
a way to describe the family of states with this particular
value of Bell violation by only one effective parameter.
B. Entanglement assisted QKD protocols
In this subsection, we consider a simple but general
entanglement assisted QKD protocol for which the min-
imum secure key rate is a function of the quantum bit
error rate (QBER), which is the mismatch between the
prepared and measured states. We establish that the
minimum QBER Q is a function of the two largest sin-
gular values λ1 and λ2 of the correlation matrix T of the
two-qubit state ρ given in Eq. (2).
The QBER dictates the minimum achievable secure
key rate rmin, thereby quantifying the minimum non-
local correlations required for security. It is also essential
for security purposes that the entangled state shared by
Alice and Bob violate the CHSH inequality (6) [14, 15].
To ensure the same both the parties can perform mea-
surements as detailed in Sec. II A to check for the viola-
tion of the CHSH inequality prior to proceeding for key
distribution.
In the scheme that we consider, the two parties Alice
and Bob who want to establish a secure key, share a two-
qubit entangled state. Each of them have a choice of two
measurement settings with binary outcomes. Both the
3parties perform measurements on their respective sub-
systems and keep a record of the obtained outcomes.
Afterwards, they publicly compare their measurement
bases and keep only those outcomes for which their bases
matched as the key.
In the ideal scenario, Alice and Bob are left with per-
fectly identical keys. However, imperfections in state
preparation, transmission and measurement processes
can yield differences in their key strings. Alice and Bob
can estimate the average error by calculating the QBER
Q after comparing a small portion of their secret key.
Formally, the QBER Q for a given state ρ is defined as
the average probability for Alice and Bob not to get cor-
related outcomes when the measurements are performed
in the same basis and is given as
Q =
1
L
L∑
α=1
∑
i6=j
〈ψαi φαj |ρ|ψαi φαj 〉
=
1
4
(
2− xt0Ty0 − xt1Ty1
)
.
(7)
where{|ψαi 〉〈ψαi |}α=0,1i=0,1 and {|φαj 〉〈φαj |}α=0,1j=0,1 denotes the
ith and jth element of the measurement basis α with
Alice and Bob respectively. The second equality can be
achieved by assuming xi and yj to be the Bloch vectors
of the elements of the measurement basis with Alice and
Bob. The terms can then be seen as singular value de-
composition of the correlation matrix T with two largest
singular values as λ1 and λ2.
Therefore, the minimum QBER is,
Q =
1
4
(2− |λ1| − |λ2|) , (8)
for λ1 and λ2 the two largest singular values of the cor-
relation matrix T .
The minimum secure key rate rmin is defined as the
average number of secret bits that can be distilled from
each run of the protocol when Alice and Bob measured
in the same basis. The minimum secure key rate is a
protocol dependent quantity and for entanglement as-
sisted protocols like the one presented above it is given
by [35, 36]
rmin = 1 + 2(1−Q) log2 (1−Q) + 2Q log2Q. (9)
Only when rmin > 0, can a secure key be distilled from
a protocol. The secure key rate is also required to be
as high as possible and as can be seen from Eq. (9) this
amounts to minimizing the Q over various values of λ1
and λ2.
We are now left with two separate conditions for the
security of a QKD protocol. One being rmin > 0 for
a secure key to be distilled while the second is the re-
quirement that the underlying entangled state violates
the CHSH inequality.
C. Local filtering
In this subsection, we present a special class of local
quantum operations which is useful to concentrate entan-
glement and non-local correlations in two-qubit systems.
Local filtering are operations which transform a state
ρ to ρ′ which has a higher concentration of entanglement
and Bell non-local correlations. Consider the local single-
qubit measurements on a two-qubit system where the
measurement operators M1,M2 for the first qubit and
N1, N2 for the second qubit. For simplicity, we choose
M2 =
√
1−M†1M1 and N2 =
√
1−N†1N1. The state
after measuring M1 and N1 is given by,
ρ′ =
(M1 ⊗N1)ρ(M1 ⊗N1)†
Tr((M1 ⊗N1)ρ(M1 ⊗N1)) . (10)
The entanglement in the state ρ′ is related to the entan-
glement in ρ as [9, 37],
C(ρ′) = C(ρ)
|det(M1)||det(N1)|
tr(M†1M1 ⊗N†1N1ρ)
, (11)
and can be made to increase if we consider opera-
tions with |det(M1)| 6= 0 and |det(N1)| 6= 0 and
|det(M1)||det(N1)| > Tr(M†1M1 ⊗ N†1N1ρ). Conse-
quently, it can be shown that for a certain class of states,
Bell violation can also be made to increase [38]. Specifi-
cally, the state ρ can be filtered to a state ρ′ which is Bell
diagonal or a special form of the ‘X’ state [27, 32] and
has higher entanglement and exhibits higher Bell non-
local correlations.
Following Ref. [27], we briefly illustrate the method to
obtain a two-qubit filtered state. Any valid operations on
the state ρ can be seen as proper orthochronous Lorentz
transformations on the Mueller matrix M [Eq. (3)] as
M ′ = LM1ML
T
N1 . (12)
The Lorentz transformations are given in terms of the
measurement operators as:
LM1 =
T (M1 ⊗M∗1 )T †
|det(M1)| ,
LN1 =
T (N1 ⊗N∗1 )T †
|det(N1)| ,
T =
1√
2
1 0 0 10 1 1 00 i −i 0
1 0 0 −1
 .
(13)
Further, the Mueller matrix can be brought to a diag-
onal or a special form by Lorentz transformations L1 and
L2 as
M = L1ΣL
T
2 , (14)
4where Σ is a diagonal Mueller matrix corresponding to a
Bell diagonal state or of the form
Σ =
a 0 0 b0 d 0 00 0 −d 0
c 0 0 a+ c− b
 . (15)
The latter of the forms can be brought close to a Bell
diagonal state for d 6= 0 by repeated application of local
filtering operations, while d = 0 corresponds to a separa-
ble initial state.
The matrix representation of these optimal local filter-
ing operations applied on the corresponding Mueller ma-
trix can be constructed by considering its columns as the
eigenvectors of MGMTG and its transposition respec-
tively, where G = diag(1,−1,−1,−1) is the Minkowski
metric. The Mueller matrix under these optimal Lorentz
transformations then transforms as
M ′ = LT1GMGL2. (16)
Finally, the singular values of the correlation matrix T
are the singular values of the matrix Mij , i, j ∈ {2, 3, 4}.
It is to be noted that the state corresponding to non-
diagonal Σ is a subset of measure zero and thus has zero
probability of occurrence. Therefore, physically states
can be brought to a Bell diagonal form which has higher
entanglement content and Bell non-local correlations.
It should be noted that local filtering for two qubits
is a special case of entanglement distillation [9, 37] when
local operations are performed on the level of single copy
of the quantum state. In the present article we restrict
access of Alice and Bob to single copies and then calculate
the secure key rate after local filtering.
III. RESULTS
In this section, we first develop a geometrical repre-
sentation of correlations to study the Bell-CHSH viola-
tion and QBER for arbitrary two-qubit states. We apply
this representation to explicitly identify states which are
optimally secure and insecure for a fixed Bell-CHSH vio-
lation for QKD. This geometrical representation offers a
useful visualization of two-qubit states from a QKD per-
spective. Next we present a new QKD protocol which
involves local filtering to improve the key rate. We con-
clude this section with explicit examples of states which
shows improved key rate upon local filtering.
A. Geometrical representation of correlations
As detailed in Sec. II A, all two-qubit states can be pa-
rameterized by the two largest singular values of the real
correlation matrix T as far as the violation of the Bell-
CHSH inequality is concerned. For a bonafide quantum
state all the singular values of the T matrix must satisfy
|λi| ≤ 1 and
∑
i λ
2
i ≤ 3. States lying outside this con-
strained region are unphysical and do not correspond to
valid density matrices. For the sake of simplicity we only
consider the region 0 ≤ λ1 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ λ2 ≤ 1 as all
the arguments presented below apply equally well to the
entire region.
The geometrical representation of the two-qubit states
parameterized by the two largest singular values of the
correlation matrix is depicted in Fig. 1. Here all physical
states are represented by shaded regions while the un-
shaded region corresponds to parameter range with no
corresponding bonafide quantum state. In this represen-
tation all the states with fixed value S of the expecta-
tion value of the CHSH operator lie on the circular arc
λ21 + λ
2
2 = S
2/4. Therefore, all the physical states that
do not violate the Bell-CHSH inequality lie within the
disc of unit radius λ21 + λ
2
2 ≤ 1, as can be seen from
Eq. (6), while all physical states lying outside this region
show a violation. Thus, for a given physical state its
distance from the origin quantifies the Bell-CHSH corre-
lation and if this distance is above 1 the state violates
the CHSH inequality. In this geometric representation,
the QBER Q is represented by straight lines with slope
−1, i.e, λ1 +λ2 = m (Fig. 1), where m is the y-intercept.
These states offer the same Q = 14 (2−m). Increasing
values of m for the straight lines corresponds to a de-
creasing QBER.
λ1
λ2
(1, 0)
(0, 1)
(1, 1)
(0, 0)
λ
1 +
λ
2 =
λ
λ 1
2
=
√
2
S< 2
States violating CHSH inequality
with Q < Qcrit
States violating CHSH inequality
with Q > Qcrit
FIG. 1. A geometrical representation of the Bell-CHSH in-
equality and the QBER Q parameterized by λ1 and λ2. The
dark grey region corresponds to states which violate the Bell-
CHSH inequality but offer Q > Qcrit. These states are there-
fore unusable for QKD. Only the states lying in the light grey
region offer a secure key rate while also violating the Bell-
CHSH inequality.
5B. Characterization of states based on the
geometrical representation
We are now ready to use the geometrical representation
described above to identify a set of states which exhibit
a violation of the Bell-CHSH inequality, but cannot be
used to distill a secure key rate. This way of identifying
states which is useless for QKD, is stricter than the one
identified earlier [35].
We also identify a set of states most suitable for ex-
perimentally implementing entanglement assisted QKD
protocols with fixed violation of the Bell-CHSH inequal-
ity. For this characterization we consider only those pro-
tocols for which the secure key rate rmin is a function of
the error rate Q alone.
It is clear from Fig. 1 that the set of states having
the same Bell-CHSH value S do not share the same er-
ror rate Q, hence the minimum secure key rate rmin is
also different. Considering entanglement as an expen-
sive resource, the variation in the error rate for the same
value of S indicates that some states are more suitable
for performing QKD than others despite having the same
Bell non-locality. This also implies that the violation of
Bell-CHSH inequality alone cannot provide a character-
ization of the security in an entanglement assisted QKD
protocol.
Note that all the classical states saturating the Bell-
CHSH bound lie on the circle λ21 + λ
2
2 = 1. However, as
noted in Sec. III A all these states do not share the same
error rate Q. The set of states offering the least error rate
Q for a given value of S lie on the line which is tangent to
the circle of radius S/2 and will satisfy λ1 = λ2 = S/2
√
2.
Therefore the set of local states saturating the Bell-
CHSH inequality and offering the least error rate lie on
the point
(
1√
2
, 1√
2
)
(Fig. 1). Since Bell-CHSH violation
is necessary for the security of the QKD protocol, the
states corresponding to the point
(
1√
2
, 1√
2
)
offer no secu-
rity. We define the error rate at this point as the critical
error rate and is given as Qcrit =
1
4
(
2−√2) ≈ 0.14. All
the state on the line λ1 +λ2 =
√
2 have the same critical
error rate (Fig. 1). All valid quantum states lying below
this line posses higher error rate and therefore can not be
used for secure QKD. To summarize, all the states above
λ21 + λ
2
2 = 1 violate Bell-CHSH inequality and all the
states below λ1 + λ2 =
√
2 have QBER more than Qcrit;
hence unusable for secure QKD. The region of intersec-
tion between these two regions contain states which are
useless for QKD, even though they are Bell non-local.
The critical line, λ1 + λ2 =
√
2 provides the theoret-
ically maximum tolerable error rate for carrying out se-
cure QKD using Bell-CHSH violation as a necessary re-
quirement. It may happen that for a given QKD protocol
Qcrit is smaller than the one we obtained. For exam-
ple, Qcrit in the protocol presented in [35] is Q
′
crit =
0.11 which is smaller than the theoretical critical value.
Therefore, using this protocol even a larger set of states
will be obtained which violate Bell-CHSH inequality but
do not provide a secure key rate.
Since it is not always possible to achieve the quantum
maximum of the Bell-CHSH inequality experimentally, it
is desirable to identify states most optimum for QKD for
a particular violation. These states should have the prop-
erty of offering the least error rate for a fixed violation
of the CHSH inequality. As detailed in Sec. III A these
states are identified with the points |λ1| = |λ2| > 1/
√
2.
In the non-ideal QKD scenario, Alice and Bob may
share states violating the Bell-CHSH inequality but with
an error rate higher than Qcrit. It is then desirable to
transform these states such that the error rate is reduced
below the critical value and the states can be used to
distill a secure key. Since we were carrying out QKD be-
tween remote locations, such transformations will have to
be local operations performed by Alice and Bob. How-
ever, local operations cannot increase the violation of
the Bell-CHSH inequality unless we sacrifice some of the
copies from the ensemble. In the following subsection, we
present a QKD protocol which incorporates local-filtering
operations, to concentrate the Bell-CHSH correlations in
order to enhance the secure key rate.
C. Secure key rate under local filtering operations
In the new QKD protocol, Alice and Bob share en-
tangled pairs of qubits in the states ρ with Bell-CHSH
value S. Let M1 and N1 be the optimal filtering opera-
tors and M2 =
√
1−M†1M1 and N2 =
√
1−N†1N1 (as
described in II C). The modified protocol then consists
of the following steps:
1. First Alice and Bob perform local measurement us-
ing {Mi} and {Nj} measurement settings. Which
is followed by followed by the measurement of the
{A1, A2} and {B1, B2} which have binary outcomes
±1.
2. Alice and Bob announce the outcome of the mea-
surement in {Mi} and {Nj} measurement set-
tings and the choice of the measurement operators
{A1, A2} and {B1, B2} for each of the qubit pair.
3. They consider only the qubit pairs for which M1
and N1 clicked, i.e., the pairs for which the local
filtering was successful. Then they reconcile their
measurement basis {A1, A2} and {B1, B2} and dis-
card the qubits for which the measurement was per-
formed in different bases.
The QKD protocol presented above relies on the fact
that we can successfully filter an ensemble of two qubit
partially entangled states into a smaller ensemble with
higher entanglement. The states with enhanced entan-
glement are used for QKD while the other states are dis-
carded. In this process one can transform states useless
for QKD into states useful for QKD, specifically the state
which violates Bell inequality but fall below the critical
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FIG. 2. Contour plot of λ1 + λ2 as a function of α1 and
α2 with λ1 + λ2 = 1.01 (Red solid), λ1 + λ2 = 1.1 (Yellow
dashed), λ1+λ2 = 1.41 (Green large dashed), while the Black
solid line is the boundary for the set of all physical states and
corresponds to α21 + α
2
2 = 1. For the purpose of QKD it is
required that λ1 + λ2 > 1.41 ∼
√
2, which identifies a huge
set of states in the parameter space of α1 and α2 to be useless
for QKD.
error rate line. The probability of success in the filtering
process is Psucc = Tr[(M1 ⊗N1)ρ(M†1 ⊗N†1 )].
D. Examples
We now provide examples of states where filtering pro-
cess is useful in enhancing the key rate. Let us begin with
the following class of pure two-qubit states:
|ψ〉 = α1|00〉+ α2|11〉+ α3|01〉, (17)
where we assume αi ∈ R and α21 + α22 + α23 = 1 and
α1 ≤ α2 ≤ α3. The Bell-CHSH violation for the state
can be calculated readily using the methods described
above,
S = 2
√
1 + 4α21α
2
2, (18)
where λ21 + λ
2
2 = 1 + 4α
2
1α
2
2 and the error rate to be
Q =
1
4
(1− 2|α1||α2|) , (19)
where λ1 + λ2 = 1 + 2|α1||α2|.
In Fig. 2 we plot λ1 + λ2 for this class of states and
infer that there exist a huge set of states in this class
which have Q > Qcrit. As an example, consider the state
given by α1 = 0.1 and α2 = 0.2, we have
λ1 + λ2 = 1.0400 <
√
2,
λ21 + λ
2
2 = 1.0008,
(20)
which implies that the state shows very little Bell-CHSH
violation and has error rate higher than the critical value.
Since these states are two-qubit entangled and therefore
distillable states, in principle, one can perform the en-
tanglement distillation (single-copy or multi-copy) and
extract pure Bell states. In this case the entanglement of
formation is the same as distillable entanglement which
can be readily calculated as,
E(ψ) = −Tr(ρA log2 ρA)
= 0.005, (21)
where ρA is the reduced state of Alice. This gives us
a qualitative indication that the state can be used for
quantum communication. However, how best to harness
this resource remains to be figured out.
After performing local filtering operations, the state
|ψ〉 can be brought into a Bell-diagonal form with the
following properties
λ′1 + λ
′
2 = 1.7354 >
√
2,
λ′21 + λ
′2
2 = 1.2271,
(22)
where λ′i are the singular values of the correlation matrix
for the state transformed after local filtering.
The above properties state that the filtered state has
higher Bell-CHSH violation and lower error rate than the
critical value. Therefore, the states belonging to the re-
gion where Bell-CHSH violation is observed but having
Q > Qcrit can be filtered to the region where a higher
Bell-CHSH violation is observed alongwith Q < Qcrit.
The secure keyrate r of the protocol with these states
can be calculated and turns out to be
r = Psuccrmin
= 0.2565 bits,
(23)
where Psucc = 0.8638 and rmin = 0.2972 bits.
Next, consider a class of mixed states with density op-
erator given by ρ
ρ =
1
4
[1 ⊗ 1+ λ(α2 − β2)(σz ⊗ 1− 1⊗ σz)
+ (1− 2λ)σz ⊗ σz − 2λαβ(σx ⊗ σx + σy ⊗ σy) ] ,
(24)
where α, β ∈ R, α2 + β2 = 1 and 0 < λ ≤ 1.
These states have been studied extensively under lo-
cal filtering operations [38]. As an example we con-
sider the randomly generated state ρ with α = −0.9789,
β = −0.2043 and λ = 0.9, which has the following prop-
erties,
λ21 + λ
2
2 = 0.7696,
λ1 + λ2 = 1.16.
(25)
This is an example of a state that does not violate Bell-
CHSH inequality and is therefore useless for QKD. The
distillable entanglement from this state turns out to be
E(C(ρ)) = h
(
1 +
√
1− C2
2
)
= 0.0471,
(26)
7where C is the concurrence of the quantum state and
h(x) = −x log2 x−(1−x) log2(1−x) is the binary entropy.
This again states that the state ρ considered above can
provide some secure key.
After applying local filtering operations as detailed
above, we get the state ρ′ with the following properties:
λ′21 + λ
′2
2 = 1.2249,
λ′1 + λ
′
2 = 1.5652.
(27)
The resultant state ρ′ is seen to violate Bell-CHSH in-
equality with Q < Qcrit, indicating that it is now a use-
ful state for QKD. Consequently, the keyrate r for the
transformed state can be calculated as
r = Psuccrmin
= 0.0071 bits,
(28)
where Psucc = 0.8894 and rmin = 0.0080 bits.
It should also be noted that at the level of single-
copy distillation, the local filtering operations considered
above have been shown to be optimal for concentrat-
ing entanglement and Bell non-locality [27]. Therefore
the key rates obtained after applying local filtering, are
the best that can be achieved, given access to individual
copies only.
Further, according to [27], Bell-diagonal states cannot
be filtered further. From Fig. 1 it can be easily seen that
there exist such Bell diagonal states which exhibit Bell-
CHSH violation, having Q > Qcrit and which cannot be
filtered. These states remain useless for QKD even after
filtering, thereby indicating that Bell-CHSH violation is
not a sufficient condition either.
IV. CONCLUSION
We develop a geometrical representation for two-qubit
correlations to quantitatively analyse the relationship be-
tween the secure key rate of a QKD protocol and the
violation of the Bell-CHSH inequality.
The usefulness of this geometrical representation is
demonstrated by showing that states sharing the same
non-local correlations do not necessarily share the same
secure key rate. This leads to an important conclusion
that some states are more apt for performing QKD effi-
ciently than others, even when they share the same non-
local correlations.
For fixed (non-maximal) Bell-CHSH violation the
states that are optimally suited for performing QKD are
located, which can be useful when Alice and Bob share
a non-maximally entangled state. We use the threshold
error rate requirement for security to identify a class of
states which cannot be used for QKD, even though they
exhibit a violation of the Bell-CHSH inequality. This
is an improvement over a previous result and has pro-
found experimental implications to develop QKD proto-
cols with non-maximal violation of Bell-CHSH inequal-
ity. Such states which are deemed useless for QKD can
be seen as a result of the specificity of the protocol con-
sidered or because of errors arising due to preparation,
transmission or measurements. To harness the entangle-
ment present in states that do not violate Bell-CHSH in-
equality we employed local filtering operations and found
that the performance of such states can be greatly im-
proved in terms of providing key rate for QKD. The local
filtering operations considered is a special subclass of en-
tanglement distillation dealing with single copies. Under
the paradigm of single copy distillation not all entangled
states can provide a secure key as compared to multi-
copy distillation in which all two qubit entangled states
can be used to distill some secure key. However, multi-
copy distillation is harder to achieve experimentally than
local filtering. Further, the protocol for local filtering de-
scribed has been shown to be optimal in the case of single
copies [27] and the secure key rate obtained under these
operations is the best that can be achieved. We explic-
itly provided examples when the original state exhibits
Bell-CHSH violation but has Q > Qcrit and states which
do not violate the Bell-CHSH inequality. It is seen that
in both cases local filtering offers improvement in terms
of secure key rate.
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